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In this paper I argue that the "placebo effect" doesn't exist; placebos do, but they are inert so they 
have no effects (that's what "inert" means).  Yet we know that often enough, things do happen 
after placebo administration. Among various causes for such change, I attribute some effects to 
the meanings the placebos convey to the participants in the medical event — the doctors, nurses, 
patients, family, community, etc., of the patient.  I call these "meaning responses," and survey here 
some of the ways they occur (with or without the presence of placebos).  Then, I describe some 
recent studies which dramatically complicate the interpretation of RCTs, and our perhaps overly 
simplistic understandings of the nature of medical efficacy.  
Introduction
In this paper, I will examine a powerful healing 
effect thru a cultural lens.
The human healing process is complicated, 
and involves a number of different dimensions, 
sometime interacting, sometimes apparently 
orthogonal.  The most important component is 
probably the action of the immune system, oper-
ating independently. Also involved are the natural 
history of many self limiting illnesses (colds, flu, 
sprains, simple broken bones); a certain amount 
of conditioning or learning, as we face an illness 
for the second or third time; regression to the 
mean (that is, things sometimes just go back to 
“normal”); bias of patients or investigators trying 
to please one another and, perhaps, themselves. 
Medication can play a role, as can meaning, that is 
the cognitive and emotional response to the rich 
skeins of relationship of objects of thought which 
are especially lively in times of crisis — like an ill-
ness of a spouse, or child, or one’s self. 
None of these is particularly controversial 
save perhaps the last; usually understood (or as 
I would prefer, misunderstood) as the “placebo 
effect,” this important element in the human 
healing project occasions periodic scorn with 
reviews denying either that these forces exist at 
all, or, if they do, they are trivial and short-last-
ing.  I’m sure most readers are familiar with the 
mini-industry of papers by Drs. Hrobartsson and 
Gotzsche which, if nothing else, have drawn atten-
tion to some of the very worst papers ever written 
within the history of medicine (Hróbjartsson & 
Gøtzsche 2001).
There is a long history of such articles, global 
attempts to explain away as a delusion one of the 
most important and interesting forces in human 
life.  Why such “skepticism” persists at the same 
time as powerful evidence continues to accumu-
late for the biological consequences of the fact of 
medical care, it’s meaning (rather than its content), 
is a striking question about a cultural phenom-
enon.  I believe that the answer to that question 
has at least two parts: first, while reductionism is 
utterly essential for a scientific approach to human 
biology, the fact is that some matters are more eas-
ily “reduced” than other; some phenomena, like 
the construction of meaning, are emergent prop-
erties of the whole of human mental, emotional, 
religious, and historical process, and they engage 
the interactions of people, communities, history 
and culture, in ways that are as richly interesting 
and important as they are complex and challeng-
ing.  Many of these processes are totally and ut-
terly invisible to us at the same time as we embody 
them; in a sense, I embody meaning in the same 
sort of way I embody my liver, of which, unless 
something vary bad is happening, I am ordinar-
ily totally unaware.  Confusing these things with 
related but vastly simpler communication systems 
(bird song, chimpanzee signing) we trivialize the 
most astonishing aspects of our being which are so 
enormous and powerful that we often simply don’t 
recognize them for what they are. We can find and 
move within such meaning thru an array of cul-
tural processes: rituals, dance, music, literature. 
Most of it we don’t understand, and needn’t: none 
of us save the most skillful and educated linguist 
can plot out the ins and outs of ordinary language, 
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and even the linguists have their limits. Yet we 
can all talk (well. . . we can try). For a primer on 
meaning, see Michael Polanyi’s book “Meaning” 
(Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).
Secondly, physicians often find these matters 
onerous, as it seems to throw even more responsi-
bility onto them for patient outcomes. “My gosh,” 
they say. “Now I’m responsible for my ‘bedside 
manner’.”  Easier to ignore the whole thing. To do 
so, however, is, in my view, to miss something of 
extraordinary human and medical importance.
This extraordinary will to disbelieve is an in-
teresting and complicated question in itself, but 
not one we can consider seriously here. 
Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s study 
(Hróbjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001) to the contrary, 
many studies in both the laboratory and the clin-
ic have shown that people receiving inert treat-
ments have received significant benefit, but few 
as elegantly and persuasively as those by Fabrizio 
Benedetti. 
 In a classic study of experimentally induced 
pain (Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997), an open injec-
tion of saline — presented as a helpful pain reliev-
er in about 6 or 8 words — is given to the members 
of one group; the outcome is compared to another 
group which receives a hidden injection of sa-
line — the same injection, but with no words — in 
the other.  That’s the only difference between the 
two groups.  Yet the open saline group shows a 
persistent decline in pain reports while the hid-
den infusion group shows a continued rise in 
pain.  Let me qualify this: Does this show us that 
placebos have effects? No, because both groups got 
placebos.  The difference between the two groups 
was words, language, meaningful utterances.*
It is not so easy to get such clear evidence of 
this in the clinic since — largely for ethical rea-
sons — it is difficult to deny sick or injured pa-
tients any treatment at all, placebo or otherwise. 
There are, however, a few such studies, including 
one looking at third molar extraction.  
Gracely’s results in a three arm trial with sub-
jects following removal of third molars shows that 
pain in a placebo treated group declined while in 
a comparable but untreated group, pain contin-
ued to increase for several hours after surgery. 
Both Visual Analog Scale and Verbal Descriptor 
Scale pain reports dropped substantially after in-
ert treatment compared to no treatment (Gracely 
et al., 1979).
One of the biggest difficulties in all this fol-
lows from the confusion of what is happening 
here with the placebo treatment.  Imagine that pa-
tients in some mythical trial are given inert tablets 
called placebos.  A week later they are different 
than at baseline; this difference is the “placebo ef-
fect.”  Of course, it’s not.  Placebos are inert; they 
don’t do anything. One reason people may be 
different is regression to the mean.  Regression to 
the mean is not caused by placebos, but by study 
selection criteria (select 1000 people with hyper-
tension; let them alone for 3 months, and many of 
them will now have “normal” blood pressure as 
things set themselves right). Placebos don’t cause 
changes due to natural history, and they don’t 
cause conditioning (for conditioning to occur, 
you have to train the subject with an active drug, 
one which has an unconditioned response; see, 
for example (Ader, 1997)). If placebos don’t do 
anything, then it seems possible that what we call 
“placebo effects” might occur without placebos. 
In an important study, 835 women who re-
ported that they regularly treated headaches with 
over the counter analgesics were randomly placed 
in 4 groups: one group received unlabeled pla-
cebo, one received placebo marked with a widely 
advertised brand name, “one of the most popu-
lar . . . analgesics in the United Kingdom widely 
available for many years and supported by exten-
sive advertising”, one received unbranded aspirin, 
and one received branded aspirin.  They noted 
the amount of headache pain relief an hour af-
ter taking the pills (Branthwaite & Cooper, 1981). 
Results: First, aspirin was more effective than pla-
cebo.  But brand name aspirin was more effective 
than generic aspirin, and brand name placebo 
was more effective than generic placebo.
In particular, 55% of headaches reported by 
branded placebo users improved after an hour 
(rated 2, 3 or 4 on the scale) while only 45% of 
410 headaches were reported to be that much 
better by unbranded placebo users (P2  =  6.76, 
p < .01).  Aspirin relieves headaches.  But so does 
the knowledge that the pills you are taking are 
good ones, which you learned on tv.  The differ-
ence here is to be attributed not to the placebo 
(which is, after all, inert) but to the brand name 
which clearly is not, enhancing the effect of both 
placebo and aspirin.
Similarly, Benedetti reported on an experi-
ment where surgery patients were treated with 
four different drugs appropriate to their condi-
tions; however, half the patients received their 
drugs openly, with an injection by a clinician, 
while half received equivalent doses of the same 
drugs by hidden infusion through an intravenous 
line (Benedetti et al., 2003).  
Patients receiving the medication openly, 
who were told they were about to receive it, re-
ported  more pain relief than those who received 
equivalent amounts of drugs secretly. Pain re-
searcher Don Price, in an accompanying editorial, 
described this study as “assessing placebo effects 
without placebo groups.”  (Price, 2001). As much 
as I respect Don Price, this is an unfortunate use 
 
* Note that this experiment 
was a replication on a whole 
new level of complexity of 
the pioneering study done a 
generation earlier by Levine, 
Gordon and Fields (Levine, 
et al. 1978)
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of language.  There were no placebos here.  So ob-
viously, there weren’t any “placebo effects.”  What 
differentiated the separate groups in this study 
were human interaction and words.  
Price did, however, recognize this: he noted 
that although the increase in pain relief in the 
study was probably not, by itself, clinically signifi-
cant, “both pain research scientists and the phar-
maceutical industry go to the ends of the earth to 
make improvements of this magnitude [to exist-
ing drugs].  Adding one or two sentences to each 
pain treatment might help to produce them” . 
Placebos are inert, but language is not!
And a recent study shows that the language 
need not be deceptive in any way. Kaptchuk has 
shown that patients with irritable bowel syn-
drome (IBS) respond favorably to compassion-
ate care, that is, thoughtful and responsive pro-
fessionals expressing concern, giving accurate 
information, and carefully discussing concerns 
with patients.  But another group of patients who 
received the same compassionate care, plus pla-
cebo tablets three times a day, which they were 
told were placebos, that is, inert tablets which had 
been shown to help people like them in the past, 
did significantly (and clinically) better than the 
first group. (Kaptchuk, 2010)  
Note that most of the examples I have giv-
en deal with pain, clearly the system most fully 
mapped for meaningful responses. But there are 
other systems which can also respond to lan-
guage and meaning.  Benedetti has replicated 
his open/hidden drug experiment in three other 
areas: diazepam in anxiety state, stimulation of 
the subthalmic nucleus in Parkinson’s patients, 
and administration of beta-blocker (propranalol) 
and muscarinic antagonists (atropine) in healthy 
volunteers .  In all these cases, when the treatment 
was given openly, it was more effective than when 
given secretly. (Benedetti et al., 2003; Colloca et 
al., 2004)
The Meaning Response
Given that there are no placebos in most of these 
experiments, it seems unwise to call these re-
sponses “placebo effects.”  And the aspirin study, 
which shows that the brand name can enhance 
the effect of an inert drug and of an active drug, 
indicates that at least one dimension of what is 
going on here is the effect of what medications 
mean.  I define the meaning response as “the psy-
chological or physiological effects of meaning in 
the treatment of illness.”  Much of what is called 
the placebo effect — the really interesting part, that 
is, meaning responses elicited with inert medica-
tions, is a special case of the meaning response, as 
is much of what is called the “nocebo effect.”
I am interested particularly in the responses 
that people have to what things mean or to what 
they know, to what others often call their expec-
tations or expectancies.  I don’t use these terms 
since they seem to me as an anthropologist in-
sensitive to culture; I anticipate before the fact 
that people in different parts of the world with 
different cultural backgrounds will know the 
world differently, and might construct different 
meanings of apparently similar objects or experi-
ences. I would suggest that, more often than not, 
expectancies are the outcome of a complex play 
of meanings.  The two approaches are not funda-
mentally different, but have different emphases.  
It is also important to note that these matters, 
where meaning has an influence on health and 
even mortality, can occur well outside the ordi-
nary bounds of the clinic.
Dr. P.D. Phillips and colleagues have shown 
that, in the presence of a broad range of diseases 
in Chinese Americans in California, those who 
are understood by Chinese traditions of astrol-
ogy to be particularly susceptible to these condi-
tions — by virtue of the year of their birth — die 
significantly earlier than those with the same 
conditions born in other years. Here are two ex-
amples from 6 or 8 which Phillips described:
Earth years
Chinese born in “earth years,” that is, years end-
ing with 8 or 9 — and consequently deemed by 
Chinese medical theory to be especially suscep-
tible to diseases involving lumps, nodules, or tu-
mors — and who have lymphatic cancer, die, on 
average, 4 years sooner than Chinese with lym-
phatic cancer born in other years.  
Lung diseases
Those with lung diseases born in “metal years”, 
years ending in 0 or 1 — in Chinese theory, “the 
lung is the organ of metal” — die on average 5 
years younger (roughly 7% of length of life!) 
than those born in other years.  There were no 
such differences found in a similar examination 
of the mortality of thousands of non-Chinese 
Californians (Phillips et al., 1993). These are very 
compelling examples of “meaning responses.”
Dying on the 4th day of the 
month.
In another study, Phillips showed that Chinese-
Americans and Japanese-Americans were more 
likely to die on the 4th day of the month than any 
other because 4 is an unlucky number; if 13 is an 
unlucky number for Californians in general, it’s 
not unlucky enough to increase the mortality rate 
(Phillips et al., 2001).  It is worth noting that these 
meanings — of metal and the lung, or of earth and 
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lumps, or of unlucky fours, are not notions con-
cocted by individual patients or therapists; they 
are icons of a sort which permeate the language 
and culture of, in this case, immigrant Chinese 
and/or their American born children, to some 
degree or other; Phillips shows in one case that 
the effects of these beliefs are influenced by the 
degree of commitment to Asian culture. These 
relationships have nothing to do with having an 
Asian body, but with having Asian ways of living, 
thinking, behaving and being. 
At least some of the time, biological processes 
can be “activated,” or perhaps “suppressed,” by 
that system of meanings we call culture.
Although these effects occur widely in hu-
man life, they are often most clearly and visibly 
displayed in the clinic.  People bring to their en-
gagements with physicians many things; patients 
are not blank slates.  But one of the most power-
ful influences on patients is their doctors.  Dozens 
of studies have demonstrated this; I’ll summarize 
one.
Such physician attitudes can be conveyed to 
patients in extremely subtle and delicate ways. 
Rick Gracely has described a phased experiment 
in which dental patients were told they would 
receive either placebo (which might reduce the 
pain of third-molar extraction, or might do noth-
ing), naloxone (which might increase their pain, 
or do nothing), the synthetic narcotic analgesic 
fentanyl (which might reduce their pain, or do 
nothing), or no treatment at all.  Subjects  were 
all recruited from the same patient stream, with 
consistent selection criteria by the same staff.  In 
the first phase of the study, clinicians (but not pa-
tients) were told fentanyl was not yet a possibil-
ity because of administrative problems with the 
study protocol; it is worth noting that fentanyl is 
well known in medical circles as a very powerful 
drug, 100 times more potent than morphine.  In 
the second phase, clinicians were told that now 
patients might indeed receive fentanyl.  Placebo 
treated patients during the first phase of the study 
received no relief from it, and, after an hour, their 
pain reports increased significantly.  In the sec-
ond phase of the study placebo treated patients 
experienced significant pain reduction from their 
inert treatment. The only apparent difference be-
tween the two groups was that the clinicians knew 
that no one in the first would get fentanyl while 
the patients in the second group might (although 
no one reported on here actually did; they all re-
ceived only placebo). It is not at all clear how phy-
sicians elicited these effects from their patients in 
a double blind trial.  But they did (Gracely et al., 
1985); the clinicians were clearly more impressed 
by fentanyl than were the patients.
The significance of clinician belief, enthusi-
asm, or commitment, seems to be a fairly broadly 
applicable principal which can be seen in a num-
ber of different contexts.  
Old treatments become less effective as new 
ones come along
It is, for example, a commonplace in medi-
cine that one should use drugs quickly before 
they lose their effectiveness; this quip has been 
attributed to William Olser, among others.  These 
data come from a meta-analysis of treatment of 
ulcer disease (Moerman, 2000).  Figure 1 shows 
the healing rates of drug groups in endoscopically 
controlled trials of two anti-secretory drugs, plot-
ted by year of publication of the study.  At least in 
the pre-internet world of the 1970s and 80s, it was 
doctors, not patients, who knew what the hot new 
drug was.  And, apparently, old drugs become less 
effective as new ones come along. 
See figure 1.
Meaning responses occur throughout medi-
cine, in surgery as well as in internal medicine.
I don’t have time to recall here the curious his-
tory of the bilateral internal mammary artery li-
gation which gained popularity in the later 1950s. 
Suffice it to say that, in two rare double blind tri-
als of a surgical procedure, combined here, peo-
ple seriously ill with angina and coronary artery 
disease did as well (maybe a little better!) with the 
sham procedure as with the “real” one.  75% to 
85% of patients experienced substantial subjective 
and objective improvement increasing exercise 
tolerance and dramatically reducing nitroglycer-
ine consumption; sham surgery patients received 
local anesthesia, and two small incisions on the 
chest which were then closed.  These figures are 
well within the range of improvement for the best 
contemporary treatments a generation later. 
Figure 1.  Effectiveness studies by date of publication for Cimetidine and Ranitidine, intro-
duced to research in 1977 and 1980, respectively.
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A recent study showed the effects of inactive 
vs. active pacemakers in obstructive hypertrophic 
cardiomyopathy. Three months after installation 
of pacemakers, randomly activated or not, all 
patients were better than at baseline.  Sham and 
active pacemaker patients were better on most 
dimensions of the study: palpitations, dizziness, 
shortness of breath, chest pain, self perceived 
health, and so on.  While pacemakers worked bet-
ter when they were turned on, they weren’t much 
better; they seem to have lowered “Cognitive 
functioning” which was much improved in inac-
tive pacemaker patients. (Linde et al., 1999)
And in a recent wrinkle in heart surgery, la-
ser transmyocardial revascularization [TMR], 
there are significant meaning responses as well. 
Biosense Direct Myocardial Revascularization 
(DMR) is a variation of this operation in which 
a laser catheter is inserted in the femoral artery, 
guided into the left ventricle, and shoots holes in 
the heart from the inside out..  These surgical pro-
cedures are reserved for patients with the most se-
vere and intractable angina. In a quite remarkable 
study,  299 patients with very serious angina were 
randomly assigned to high dose, low dose, or no 
dose of DMR.  
At baseline, all patients were rated as class IV 
on the Canadian Cardiology Society Angina Class 
(CCS) scale, a physician assessment which was 
the primary outcome of the study (CSS 4 means 
“angina at rest, i.e., severe limitation”). Two thirds 
of the patients improved two or more grades on 
the CCS. Improvement was substantial, and the 
same, after 3 months and 6 months for patients 
who received high dose, low dose, or no treat-
ment with laser catheter inserted but not fired. 
Disease perception was dramatically improved, as 
were a broad range of other secondary outcome 
measures (Leon et al., 2005; Leon, 2000)*.
Alan Johnson made, I think, a prescient ob-
servation in 1994; “Electrical machines have great 
appeal to patients [and doctors] and recently 
anything with the word ‘laser’ attached to it has 
caught the imagination” (Johnson, 1994).  He left 
out the doctors, but I don’t!  As an aside, I urge 
you to take a look at the web sites of the com-
panies that make and market these laser instru-
ments, a primary source of patient education 
for this surgery.  Watch very compelling mean-
ing being created out of virtual laser beams with 
Macromedia Flash.
What we know, what we think, what we are 
led to believe, or what we understand, whether we 
know it or not, can have a significant effect in the 
context of medical care.
Let me add an important caveat; while I be-
lieve that it is always prudent to imagine that ev-
ery medical intervention includes some portion 
of the meaning response, it isn’t always the case. 
A study of a statin (Rosuvastatin) and its effect on 
cholesterol  showed a very classic dose response 
rate: 8 groups of patients were given increasing 
doses of the drug, from 0 to 80 mg per day.  The 
group with 0 mg had no response.  This is un-
usual, but very interesting; it suggests that the 
liver operates in a way somehow insulated from 
neurological influence which seems odd, but not 
impossible.   What this also shows is that we are 
dealing with a complex form of physiology here, 
not magic. If it isn’t magic, what is it?
I would argue that it is here where we confront 
one of the biggest and most interesting challenges 
in this whole arena; and I would suggest that they 
are very big, very important, and very interest-
ing challenges, Nobel Prize challenges.  One of 
the classic ways that people have dismissed these 
matters in the past has been by saying, “Well, it’s 
all in your head.”  It turns out they are right, but 
not in the dismissive way they intended
Parkinson’s disease has long been known by 
clinicians to be susceptible to influence by inert 
treatments.  Imaging studies by a group from 
British Columbia have shown a neurological ba-
sis for this common clinical observation.  Using 
PET scanning, the authors showed substantial 
increase in occupancy of D2 receptors with do-
pamine in the striatum after an injection of saline 
solution to a Parkinson’s patient presented as his 
standard medication; the increased dopamine 
crowds out the radioactive dye. These effects are 
similar in magnitude to the effect of amphet-
amine in healthy people; the authors note that an 
area of the nucleus accumbens is also susceptible 
to placebo effect in Parkinson’s (de La Fuente-
Fernandez et al., 2001).
In a somewhat more complex study, regional 
glucose metabolism in PET scans of fluoxetine 
(Prozac in the US) has been shown to overlap 
the metabolic pattern of placebo in depressed pa-
tients. The active regions in fluoxetine responders 
overlap the area where activity was evident in pla-
cebo responders (Leuchter et al., 2002). Although 
the clinical response of drug and placebo patients 
was very similar in this study, drug response in 
brain activity was somewhat more general than 
placebo response. In another, similar study, the 
authors concluded that “Active fluoxetine treat-
ment was associated with additional and unique 
changes in the brainstem, striatum and hippo-
campus” (Mayberg et al., 2002). This may help 
to account for why it is that, while placebo treat-
ment of depression is often very nearly as effec-
tive as is treatment with SSRIs, there is often sub-
stantially less evidence of unwanted side effects 
with placebo.
 
*It may be worth noting that 
this research, done in the 
nineties, was first reported 
at the American College 
of Cardiology meetings in 
Florida in 2000. The paper 
itself was not published for 
nearly 6 years; reading it 
shows at least this retired-
editor a clear case of a paper 
dramatically damaged by 
peer-review.
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Variability in meaning re-
sponse
Given this, that it’s “all in your head,” and that it 
involves language, it seems reasonable to imagine 
that cultural factors — different ways of knowing 
the world through language and meaning — will 
shape different responses to the same “placebos” 
around the world. There is a great deal of variabil-
ity in the response to meaning in medicine, which 
I wish to look at briefly now.
If there is a single shibboleth in the world of 
the effect of meaning or of placebos, it is that “pla-
cebo effects occur about a third of the time.”  I 
can’t address the history of this idea here, but I 
can assure you that it is wrong.
My study of  the 4-week endoscopically veri-
fied healing rates in 117 control groups in trials of 
anti-secretory medications prescribed for peptic 
ulcer disease showed that they ranged from 0.0% 
to 100% (Moerman, 2000).  Meaning responses 
can be extremely variable.  I am convinced that 
the study of this variability can be  a key to de-
veloping a fundamental understanding of how 
meaning interacts with human biology.
Colour 
Colour makes a difference: changing the colour 
of a pill can change its effects in a variety of ways. 
In one particular case, a dozen or more studies 
have shown that red pills tend to act as uppers/
stimulants while blue ones tend to act as down-
ers/sedatives. Moreover, although they probably 
don’t realize they are doing it, drug manufacturers 
tend to follow suit, colouring their drugs to match 
these cultural expectations.  DeCraen has shown 
that this is more generally true.  He and his col-
leagues did a study of 49 medicines available for 
sale in Holland which affect the nervous system. 
They found that stimulant medications tend to be 
marketed in red, orange or yellow tablets, while 
depressants or tranquilizers tend to marketed in 
blue, green or purple ones (de Craen et al., 1996)
There are some interesting exceptions to this 
pattern.  In a series of experiments in Italy, it was 
shown that blue sleeping tablets, or blue placebos 
presented as sleeping tablets, worked better than 
did tablets of other colours, but only for Italian 
women; blue tablets tended to have a stimulat-
ing effect on men!  Checking with an Italian-
American anthropologist colleague*, we came up 
with this speculation. 
Many Italian women have a special relation-
ship with the Virgin who is, in Roman Catholic 
tradition, the protector of women; in religious 
art, the Virgin Mary is almost always shown in 
blue.  This iconography — the blue virgin — ex-
tends well beyond Italy. But the relationship to 
women seems to be particularly strong in Italy 
although it may be so elsewhere as well.  What 
about men. “Azzuri” is the name (and the colour) 
of the Italian national football team. Blue, for 
many Italian men, is not a colour of solace but of 
excitement and stimulation, of joy and madness, 
of exhilaration and, too often, of catastrophe (The 
Italian team last won the World Cup in 2006, the 
last quadrennial games, beating France.)  But it’s 
hardly the colour of sleep.
Symbols are often polysemic; a single colour, 
the same blue, can be associated with stimulation 
and excitement, and also associated with solace 
and protection. It seems a plausible way to think 
about the experimental results. Anecdotally it 
may be worth mentioning that Italian football 
fans holler “Forza Azzurri” to cheer on their 
team.   Let me note that I have a certain sympa-
thy for this proposition since a good translation 
of “Forza Azzuri” is “Go Blue,”† the chant of the 
University of Michigan Wolverines who wear 
maize and BLUE colours as they routinely play 
(another sort) of football in Michigan Stadium in 
front of 110,000 screaming fans. Not a soporific 
sight, even for a jaded fan like me. It is also true 
that the French national football team, the World 
Cup Champions in 1998, are known as Les Bleus; 
I am aware of no evidence to show that this has 
any effect on sleeping tablets in that country, or 
in Michigan, for that matter.
Form
As colour can make a difference in the meaning 
of medicine, so can form. For example, Ton de 
Craen has shown that injected placebo is more 
effective than oral placebo in the treatment of mi-
graine headache (de Craen et al., 2000).  When 
the drug sumitriptan (known in the United States 
as Imitrex, and as Imgran elsewhere) was first in-
troduced, it was only available in the form of an 
injection; today it is still available that way, but 
also as tablets and nasal spray.  De Craen did a 
meta-analysis of 35 trials.  In placebo treated pa-
tients, among those treated with a pill taken by 
mouth, after two hours 26% of patients reported 
that their headache was better (it was gone, or 
mild).  Of those treated with a placebo injec-
tion, 32% of patients  were better. This difference 
is small (6.7%) but it is statistically significant 
(P2 = 9.4, p = 0.002).
Number 
Similarly the number of pills can make a differ-
ence. In a very subtle meta-analysis, Ton DeCraen 
showed that in some 80 studies of several antise-
cretory medications for peptic ulcer, there was 
a significant difference in the endoscopically 
verified healing rates for those who took two 
 
† Friend and colleague — and 
native speaker of Ital-
ian — Emanuela Appetiti 
contributed to this inter-
pretation, and assisted with 
the translation of the highly 
idiomatic “Forza Azurri.”
 
* Lola Romanucci-Ross sug-
gested this idea.
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placebos per day (36%) compared to those who 
took 4 per day (44%), a difference of 8 percent, 
where P2 = 21.7, p < 0.0000 (de Craen et al., 1999).
National cultural differences
There are also other cultural factors which are as-
sociated with some variation (in addition to co-
lour). Recall the study of inert injection vs. inert 
tablet for migraine; shots worked better than pills. 
In studies which were carried out in the United 
States, the same pattern appeared: 22% oral vs. 
34% subcutaneous placebo relief rate.  In studies 
done in Europe however, the difference disap-
peared: 27% oral vs. 25% subcutaneous placebo 
relief rate (de Craen et al., 2000; Moerman, 2002) 
Injections work better than pills, but only in the 
USA.  There are cultural differences shaping the 
placebo effect. 
In my work with peptic ulcers, the mean pla-
cebo healing rate (again, 4-week, endoscopically 
controlled) in 6 German studies is 59%; the rate in 
3 Brazilian studies is 7%.  For ulcer patients taking 
placebo, the NNTb (the number needed to treat 
for a benefit*) for being German (not Brazilian) is 
2. There is no obvious reason why this should be 
the case; to contextualize these differences would 
require a challenging and complex research study 
(for which I have not been able to get funding af-
ter years of effort). 
Sticking closer to home for the Germans: 
Perhaps Brazilians and Germans have funda-
mentally different kinds of ulcers (although there 
is no evidence for this at all).  Comparing the 6 
German studies to 5 studies from Germany’s 
northern low-country neighbors in Denmark and 
the Netherlands, the German placebo healing 
rate is 59% compared to the Danish/Dutch  rate of 
22%.  For ulcer patients taking placebo, the NNTb 
for being German (not Danish or Dutch) is 3.
Note that the situation is not a simple one; 
these differences seem to vary by illness: the con-
trol group healing rates in treating hypertension 
are substantially lower in Germany than in other 
Western nations (Moerman, 2000). These are not 
generic cultural phenomena, or “racial” phenom-
ena, but seem to be specific cultural ones as dif-
ferent conceptualizations, or understandings, or 
constructions of illness in different cultures seem 
to have a real impact on health and healing.
Historical variation
Indeed, these kinds of differences can be seen not 
only between different cultures, but through time 
as attitudes and understandings change.  Walsh 
reviewed 75 trials of various antidepressants: tri-
cyclics, and  SSRIs compared with placebo.  The 
effectiveness of drug treatment for depression has 
trended up substantially, so that the proportion of 
patients responding to tricyclic antidepressants 
and to SSRIs had increased from about 40% to 
about 55%.  Over the same period, the propor-
tion of patients responding to placebo increased 
from about 20% to about 35%.  The proportion 
responding was strongly correlated with the year 
of publication of the study for both drug and pla-
cebo treatment.  The authors conclude that “Some 
factor or factors associated with the level of pla-
cebo response must therefore have changed sig-
nificantly during this period. Unfortunately, we 
were not able to identify these factors” (Walsh et 
al., 2002).
However, the matter doesn’t seem too compli-
cated to me.  Over the past generation, there has 
been a clear shift in consciousness among doc-
tors, patients, friends, and, generally, everyone, 
to the effect that depression can be treated with 
drugs.  This was simply not the case (or at least 
not broadly shared) 20 or 25 years ago.
  As recently as 1970, for example, Goodman 
and Gilman’s Pharmacological Basis of 
Therapeutics, one of the standard reference 
sources, was clearly more enthusiastic about elec-
tro-convulsive therapy (ECT) than it was about 
treatment with imipramine or amitriptyline, 
which were said never to be more effective than 
ECT (Goodman & Gilman, 1970). 
Today, while we practically never hear of 
ECT †,  we all “know” that drugs are effective for 
depression; we read it in the newspapers, in the 
scientific journals; we see it on tv dramas, and, in 
the US at least, we see it in drug company adver-
tisements everywhere, both in professional media 
and on tv commercials, blogs, and, of course, in 
our spam e-mail plus Twitter and Facebook.  
Antidepressant drugs are available in the 
drugstore, and, in the form of St. John’s Wort, at 
the drug section of your local supermarket ‡.  As 
we change our views of the effectiveness of drugs, 
their effectiveness changes, as do their placebo 
mimics in trials. Meanings change and so do 
meaning responses. 
And although I have yet to find any indica-
tion of it in the medical literature, there are press 
reports (Silberman, 2009) which suggest that re-
cently many large drug companies, after losing 
millions of dollars in drug development after their 
investigational drugs failed to outperform place-
bo in Phase II trials have become very concerned. 
There are indications that they have formed a 
secret committee to compare all their own trial 
results to determine what is happening, why the 
effect of dummy drugs is increasing.
 
* The NNTb, or number 
needed to treat is a clinically 
relevant statistic describing 
the value of a drug or treat-
ment. If in a trial with 100 in 
each of two groups, and all 
of the drug group got better 
while none of the control 
group did, then the NNTb, 
the number needed to treat 
to get one person better is 
1.  If (more realistically) 50 
of the drug group and 25 of 
the control group improved, 
the NNTb would be the 
inverse of the relative risk 
(1/(0.5 – 0.25) = 1/0.25 = 4); 
that is, you would need to 
treat 4 people to get one 
person better.
 
† It is also true that, what-
ever public opinion might 
have to say about ECT after 
"One Flew over the Cuckoo's 
Nest," it remains a valuable 
treatment of choice for 
many with the most severe 
and debilitating depression 
(Kelly and Zisselman 2000)
 
‡ In a complex RCT, Hyperi-
cum was shown to be more 
effective than sertraline 
(Zoloft); however both 
were less effective than the 
placebo control. All three 
treatments led to quite satis-
factory outcomes for about 
a third of patients treated 
(HDTSG 2002).
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Conclusions
What we know, understand, think, and feel; what 
we are told and believe; our cultural background; 
the relationships we have with our clinicians — our 
doctors, residents, interns, nurses, aids, orderlies, 
and probably receptionists and parking lot atten-
dants — can very directly affect our response to 
medicines, inert or otherwise.  These matters are, 
these days, largely left to chance, or to ideology, or 
to market forces, but are rarely subject to robust 
science, although that’s less true today, thankfully, 
than it was a decade ago. The clinical implications 
of these matters are clearly rich and full, and vir-
tually unexamined.  
were the same for both groups. "Similar 
improvements were seen in both groups 
with respect to pain at night and at rest, 
physical functioning, quality of life and 
perceived improvement" (Buchbinder, et 
al. 2009). In both studies, all the patients 
got better, with active or sham surgery. It is 
important to note the dilemma here: ordi-
narily, if the treatment isn't better than the 
control, it is abandoned as a treatment.  But 
here, both the treatment AND the control 
made significant improvements in the lives 
of elderly patients (treatment: 74.2 yrs old; 
control: 78.9 yrs old), mostly women. 
Complicating matters are two recent 
studies of acupuncture for low back pain, 
one done in Germany (the GERAC trial), 
and one done at several sites on the US 
west coast. In the GERAC trial, 1162 pa-
tients participated in a three-arm trial: 
traditional Chinese acupuncture in one 
group, sham acupuncture (superficial nee-
dling at non-acupuncture points in the sec-
ond group, and conventional care (drugs, 
physical therapy, and exercise following 
the standard German guidelines) in the 
third. Outcome was measured in terms of 
response to one of two standard pain ques-
tionnaires.  The results at 6 months showed 
that 48% of the verum acupuncture group 
was better; 44% of the sham acupuncture 
group was better, and 27% of the standard 
care groups was better.  "Low back pain 
improved after acupuncture treatment for 
at least 6 months. Effectiveness of acu-
puncture, either verum or sham, was al-
most twice that of conventional therapy" 
(Haake, et al. 2007).
The American trial enrolled 638 adults 
who were randomly assigned to 4 groups: 
individualized acupuncture, standardized 
acupuncture, simulated acupuncture (us-
ing a toothpick in a guide tube), and stan-
dard care (at the patient's and their phy-
sician's choice, usually a combination of 
drugs and physical therapy).  Primary out-
come was based on telephone interviews 
In the fall of 2009, the NEJM published two remarkable articles in the same is-
sue describing two randomized controlled 
trials,  one from the Mayo Clinic, and 
one from a group of investigators in Mel-
bourne, Australia. The trials looked at a 
surgical procedure called vertebroplasty 
of painful osteoporotic vertebral fractures. 
Older persons, especially women, often 
have osteoporosis which leads to a weak-
ening of the vertebrae which sometimes 
simply break. With verteboplasty, the bro-
ken vertebra are repaired with an injection 
of medicinal glue — polymethylmethac-
rylate or PMMA. There are an estimated 
750,000 persons in the US with such frac-
tures; there are as many as 9 verteboplasty 
procedures per 1000 persons in the US an-
nually, and the annual direct care for these 
fractures in the US is estimated to range 
from $12 to $18 billion in 2002 (Weinstein 
2009). This is, then, a substantial industry.
In the Australian study, 71 patients fin-
ished the trial; the verum group had the 
standard procedure while the control 
group underwent  a sham procedure where 
no needle was inserted into the bone.  In 
the Mayo Clinic trial, 131 patients com-
pleted the trial; both groups received an-
esthesia in the fractured vertebra, but the 
control group did not receive the subse-
quent injection of PMMA. In both studies, 
PMMA was opened and released in the op-
erating chamber since it has a distinctive 
odor (although it would probably not be all 
that distinctive to patients). 
In the Mayo Clinic study, at one month 
after surgery, "there was no significant dif-
ference between the verteborplasty group 
and the control group. . . [and] both groups 
had immediate improvement in disabil-
ity and pain scores after the intervention" 
(Kallmes, et al. 2009). In the Australian 
study, "there were significant reductions 
in overall pain in both study groups at 
each follow-up assessment. At 3 months, 
the mean reductions" in overall pain score 
based on the Roland–Morris disability 
Questionnaire; there were a range of sec-
ondary outcome measures.   The patients 
in the acupuncture groups all gained 4.4 to 
4.5 points on the disability scale compared 
with 2.1 points for the usual care group 
8 weeks after treatment. These changes 
generally were still evident, in the same 
pattern, after 52 weeks. "In conclusion, 
acupuncturelike treatments significantly 
improved function in persons with chronic 
low back pain" (Cherkin, et al. 2009).
These remarkable studies demonstrate 
just how effective "inert" therapy can be. 
But of course the bone surgery in each 
group was complex and dramatic; there's 
no room here to describe the elaborate 
fluoroscope suites where such work is 
done (many of these procedures are done 
by radiologists!) There are elaborate and 
technology-rich diagnostic procedures in-
volved that narrow down a complex ach-
ing, debilitating pain to a simple, visible, 
line on an x-ray, repairable with a little 
drop of super glue.
Likewise, acupuncture has led a charmed 
life in America since James Reston's Chi-
nese appendectomy in 1971. Millions of 
Americans have had acupuncture treat-
ments though perhaps only a half dozen of 
them understand anything about qi. And 
now we know that acupuncture is better 
for treating low back pain (a major nemesis 
of conventional medicine) than is ordinary 
medical care, but it is not substantially bet-
ter than sham treatment.
How to reconcile these studies with our 
everyday understanding of medical causal-
ity is challenging. But they do force us to 
consider the role — throughout all of medi-
cine — of the power of medicine's ritual, 
narrative, and performance, which, more 
and more often, seem to trump its "evi-
dence based" remedies.
An "Appendix": Placebo dilemmas, or, Meaning strikes back.
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